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Any serious student of Epistemology must eventually 
come to grips with the epistemological project set forth 
in Edmund Husserl*s Ideen (Ideas) of 1913. After all, 
Husserl may well have been the very last of his breed. 
This is certainly true if one is inclined to treat Hegel 
as the last of the Metaphysicians. For Husserl overcame 
epistemological dualism in as grand and complete a manner 
as Hegel had overcome metaphysical dualism. Each, from 
his own perspective, argued for the ultimate 
intelligibility of Reality by man-the-experiencer (viewed, 
of course, as capax veritatis)• Thus, whether or not 
Husserl or Hegel succeeded or failed to close the question 
regarding the relation between "subjects" and "objects," 
each seems at least to have brought his respective 
philosophical project to its ultimate fruition. Erazim 
Kohak has sought, in his Idea and Experience, to account 
for Husserl's success. As an addition to the growing 
wealth of Husserlian scholarship, it is perhaps the best 
commentary one could hope for: Although not designed for 
philosophical laymen, it is well-tailored for 
phenomenological laymen. The terminology is well-
illustrated with appeals to everyday experience, and the 
fundamental -themes of Husserl's thinking (often obscured 
in the original by sheer verbosity and unfathomable 
introductions of terminology) are presented with amazing 
clarity. Indeed, the project of Kohak's Idea and 
Experience so mirrors Husserl's own project in the Ideen 
(as well a commentary's project ought to) that the 
Husserlian themes become the very themes of Kohak's 
commentary. Thus Kohak*s book is not merely a commentary, 
but equally well an attempt to think in the style and 
spirit of Husserlian Phenomenology. And this means that 
his project is not one of paraphrasing; rather, Kohak sets 
out to uncover within experience the various foundations 
for Husserl's insights into the nature of our capacity for 
apodictic knowledge. In the process, he arrives at a 
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surprisingly high number of very helpful examples. For 
not only do they present the reader with a compact vision 
of Husserl's meaning, they also make it almost unavoidable 
to raise questions which threaten the very project of 
Classical/Modern Epistemology which Husserl's 
Phenomenology sought to complete. This built-in impetus 
to raise questions which both Kohak and Husserl fail to 
postulate may well end up being the ultimate merit of Idea 
and Experience. 
I 
If we take Kohak seriously, we must recognize that 
although Husserl was infatuated with the spirit of 
Cartesian thinking, his principal endeavor was to effect a 
radical synthesis of Humean empiricism and Kantian 
idealism. For Hume, of course, experience is the point of 
departure which alone can be utilized in our attempt to 
account for the human's capacity to grasp principles 
(Wesen). But "experience" for Hume includes nothing more 
than the mere perception of particulars: thus we can have 
no knowledge of reality structured by a notion of eternal 
validity. Kant, on the other hand, wants to argue that 
while we must take as our point of departure the "sensory 
given," experience arises only after our application of 
the categories. Thus, not only is experience post-
judgmental, it is equally well subject-dependent; without 
the transcendental unity of apperception, there can be no 
order or regularity in Nature, nor even the possibility of 
knowing an object in experience (Critique of Pure Reason, 
A 125-6). For Hume, then, there can be no experience of 
principles, no "having" or Ideas (Eidos). Ideas and 
Experience are totally incompatible. Kant, on the other 
hand, does indeed recognize the compatibility of Ideas and 
Experience, though for him each is mind-dependent. 
Husserl's project, according to Kohak, is to advance an 
argument which will account for two things: the primacy 
of reality as experiential, and the fundamental subject-
dimension which makes reality and experience intelligible. 
Husserl feels we have to start with experience because it 
alone makes entities intelligible, but we can only 
understand experience if we "recognize the fundamental I-
orientation of its intelligibility" (Kohak, p. 45). It 
is, then, the subject-function which "constitutes" 
experience as an intelligible system. But because reality 
is fundamentally experiential, we do not impose categories 
which order and regulate the sensory givens of perception; 
rather, experience is given to us (and indeed presents 
itself) as making sense. Ideas, then, are not "in the 
mind," but there in experience. But "experience" means a 
great deal more to Husserl than grasping particulars via 
sense perception. This would be experience as Erfahrung. 
He needs instead to ground knowledge in Erlebnis, the 
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"subjectively lived process of consciousness" which 
"includes patterns and principles as well as particulars." 
And here the traditional categories of subject and object 
simply do not apply. For without the human's purposive, 
intentional orientation, there can be no "grasping," no 
"seeing." And yet, there can be no "seeing" without the 
presence of an object. Each is co-primordial, arising as 
correlative aspects of a single context, experience. As 
Kohak remarks, 
both common-sense reflection and the sciences based on 
it tend to overlook that reality as experience is 
always structured with reference to a subject who 
lives it and is aware of living it. Lived experiences 
. are never "objective" in the sense of existing 
neutrally as discrete givens. They always fit 
together in the unity of a subject's experience. 
Thus two ship-wrecked survivors who killed a third member 
in the life-boat for his canteen of water were not after 
some neutral object we all call "water." Rather, 
they killed him for what really was a supzemely 
valuable object-in-experience. Water-worth-a-life is 
not simply a survivor's "subjective impression" of an 
"objectively" worthless entity. Rather, it is a 
different kind of entity whose being is not physical 
or mental but experiential. (Kohak, pp. 58 and 55, my 
emphasis) 
The point here is that the water is not "judged" to be 
worth-a-life, but is grasped as being worth-a-life. The 
water is literally seen (within the intentional 
orientation) as the meaning-entity water-worth-a-life. 
And qua "object," the water can be real in no other way. 
No more talk, in other words, about two-tiered realities: 
In our ordinary experience, appearance does not 
function as a mental double, hiding and hinting at an 
unseen reality. Here appearance is reality appearing, 
the real object presenting itself in experience. 
Speculation aside, in ordinary experience to be real 
means to appear as real in someone's experience. 
(Kohak, pp. 50-51) 
But by this Husserl does not mean to suggest that 
experience and meaning are private (and thus arbitrary). 
On the contrary, as Kohak correctly remarks, Husserl is 
"pointing out that it is the presence of subjects— 
subjects as such, including you and me but not you or me 
in particular—that gives to whatever there may be the 
unity and meaning of a reality" (Kohak, p. 104). Of 
course, to preserve Husserl's stand against Kantian 
idealism and epistemological dualism, Kohak must add, in 
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the same breath, that "the contents of our experience 
acquire the status and force of 'reality' to the extent 
that they present themselves as coherent and meaningful." 
Since this is only possible within the context of 
experience (according to Husserl), Kohak is quite 
justified in concluding that "reality is not in the world 
or in the m i n d — i t is in experience" (Ibid., my emphasis). 
Ergo, reality is experiential. Take as an example your 
experience as a participant in a theatre audience. If 
"reality" was confined to the object-world which the 
sciences postulate as primary, then a gush of catsup would 
hardly be blood, nor the backdrop an impenetrable wall. 
But because we in fact experience stage props as entities 
which have derived their meaning from the roles and human 
acts portrayed in the play, we have to see that reality is 
neither "subjective".(arbitrary) nor "objective" (and thus 
a collection of neutral things-in-themselves). It is both 
subject-oriented (since lived experience never appears as 
anonymous) and intrinsically meaningful in its givenness. 
Suppose, for instance, that you are suddenly threatened. 
If you are like most of us, you will experience this 
threat, "but ignore the experience, passing through it to 
posit a threatening object, and then devote [your] 
energies to changing the object" (Kohak, p. 9 2 ) . But as 
long as you ignore that mode of experience which is 
"being-threatened," you will remain unable to come to 
grips with the reality of being threatened. You will 
remain equally unable to see that the threat is neither in 
the world nor in the mind, but rather in experience. Thus 
to understand the threat we must, as Kohak puts it, "focus 
not on the subject, not on the world, but on the way [(the 
subject) experiences (the world)]" Kohak, p. 92, as in 
original). The point is to take experience in its lived 
unity, as a "way of being in and coping with the world, 
[of] having a world in an active sense," where the term 
"world" is taken to mean "something that arises in the 
context of the subject's active perceiving" (Kohak, p. 
121). Perhaps you are about to study a child who is prone 
to delinquent behavior. Would it not be pure folly to 
explain away such behavior as a product of the child's 
environment (be it middle-class, underprivileged, or 
whatever)? "What we need is not to explain what 'made' 
him do it," writes Kohak, 
but rather to understand what, as he understood his 
own acts, he chose to do. In our terminology, we need 
to understand^ what kind of noematic world he 
constituted about himself so that his behavior 
appeared appropriate to him. (Kohak, p. 137) 
This type of approach contrasts sharply with our three-
hundred year-old habit of seeking causal explanations "out 
there" in the world to help us evaluate what is going on 
"in the mind." We are practically convinced that lived 
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experience is thoroughly opaque, that experience must be 
observed if it is to become transparent (Kohak, p. 173). 
But as observed, experience "automatically becomes 
polarized between a disembodied observing mind and a 
meaningless observed movement, giving rise to the problem 
of their relation and of the primacy of one or the other." 
We lose touch with the experiencing. And if we lose touch 
with this, we are left unable to understand the nature of 
the world which the delinquent youth constituted within 
the context of his intentional, orientation which allowed 
him to project his behavior as appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
I can present no more than a skeleton of Kohak's 
argument substantiating Husserl's characterization of 
experience as the primordial datum for knowledge 
acquisition. Yet it should be clear by now how Husserl 
goes about his project of overcoming epistemological 
dualism. A careful reading of Kohak's first six chapters 
will flesh out the project in detail and expose 
innumerable clues as to how the difficult terminology 
should be understood. 
II 
What we need to consider now is Husserl's claim that 
experience is Evidenz. As I suggested in my opening, 
Kohak presents a lucid exposition of the Husserlean 
project, but fails to extend any critical remarks. Yet as 
I also remarked, his exposition is so lucid that the 
obvious guestions needing to be asked of Husserl rise into 
clear view. In turning to a characterization of Kohak's 
presentation of the Husserlean claim that experience is 
Evidenz, I hope to give expression to those questions 
which occurred to me. 
V/e have spoken thus far of the primordiality of 
experience-as-lived, and of the I-orientation which 
fundamentally rounds the intelligibility inherent in 
experience. But how can we speak of the "ground" of 
something "inherent?" And furthermore, how can Husserl 
evade Idealism if the reality of things arises only in the 
constitution of these things as meaningful? I pose this 
second question because Husserl's answer to the first 
question must be that experience itself is a constitutive 
act. And yet he does not want us to take this to mean 
that experience is the product of a synthesizing activity. 
Rather, he wants us to see that it is experience which 
makes entities intelligible, that entities are only 
meaningful within the context of experience which is 
itself a source of primordial givenness grounded in "the 
structure of being-a-subject as such" (Kohak, p, 68 and 
102). This means two things: first, that it is the act 
of "seeing" which "singles out an object," and secondly, 
that this act of seeing (Erlebnis) gives rise (through the 
constituting activity of consciousness) to "an object 
defined by the way it functions (the way it 'be's') in a 
subject's experience, In other words, an Intentional 
object" (Kohak, p. 62). Kohak offers the example of 
leaping after a precious ring that is slowly rolling 
toward the sewer: "The lived reality is not ring + 
sentimental value but rather the noema, constituted in 
experience: this precious ring." To speak, then, of 
objects as "noemata" is not to speak of Kantian 
constructs, but rather to speak of things "as actually 
presenting themselves in the context of experience" 
(Kohak, p. 128). This becomes the source of the 
Husserlian claim that experience is Evidenz, that 
experience is "primordially intelligible as lived." Now, 
the leap made here to Evidenz is justified insofar as the 
term is translated "evident givenness," for this is 
precisely what experience is for Husserl. The problems 
begin to arise (at least for me) when Husserl (and Kohak) 
introduces the possibility of "seeing" eternal validity, 
principles (Wesen) and Ideas (Eidos). In short, Husserl 
wants to argue that experience presents us with facts and 
essences. Indeed, if experience presented us with nothing 
more than facts, "reality" would be "a meaningless 
aggregation of fragments." Experience is intelligible 
only because facts "present themselves . . . as structured 
by an eidos, as making sense" (Kohak, p. 18). Thus it is 
"our awareness of a principle which enables us to see the 
raw data of our experience as intelligible objects rather 
than as a confusion of particulars." This "raw data" is, 
to use the Husserlian term, "hyletic" data, and comprises 
(contrary to Humean thinking) only one aspect of the 
primordial givenness in experience. The other aspect, 
which comprises our awareness of principles, is the 
meaning-giving act, or what Husserl calls the "noetic" 
phase of constitution. But unless we risk falling back 
into Kantianism, we must note that the noetic phase is 
"correlated" with the noematic phase. The noema, then, 
can be viewed either as the product of the meaning-giving 
act (which it is), or as the object-given-in-experience 
(which it also is). As Kohak suggests, the noetic phase 
is "the experience as meaning-giving," and the correlative 
noematic phase is "the experience as meaningful" (p. 127). 
To use another one of Kohak's examples, a ship is merely 
a "bundle of contiguous impressions" of planks, ropes, and 
canvas until the hyletic data are unified into a ship by 
the intentional orientation which is my desire to sail. 
In the moment of this "purposive act," the "aggregate" of 
planks, rope and canvas "bobbing at anchor in the harbor 
becomes a ship." It takes my "purposive presence," then, 
to see essences (Kohak, pp. 52-3). Of course, since 
Husserl holds that we can only perceive entities 
perspectivally, we must assume that in Kohak's example one 
is not seeing "a ship" but rather "ship-ness." And yet 
this is not Husserl's point (nor do I take it to be 
Kohak's point). For Husserl says at one point in the 
Ideen that I do not merely see the front of the house 
while I stand before it; I see the house from the front. 
And of course this is true. But is it the case that I am 
grasping an eidos when I see the house from the front? Or 
is it rather, as the later Wittgenstein would say, merely 
the case that I perceive enough aspects of this thing 
before me to be "able to go on" and grasp a house? And 
why must not Husserl claim that one can grasp at most a 
perspective of an eidos? After all, he himself says at 
one point in the Ideen (as quoted by Kohak) that 
"awareness of principles is a primordial presentive act 
and, as such, is analogous to sense perception" (Kohak, p. 
165). For someone who claims to faithfully articulate the 
givenness of experience, "without any hypothetical or 
interpretive elaboration, without injecting anything that 
might have been suggested to us not by pure awareness 
itself but by traditional theories, ancient or modern," 
Husserl seems to be jumping onto the I-see-essences 
bandwagon without experiential justification. Kant 
suddenly looks to be the better respondent to Hume. But 
to say that I must make a judgment before I can experience 
a particular is hardly as satisfying as the Husserlian 
claim that my ability to see principles and ideas lies at 
the foundation of my ability to see particulars! But why 
is it only because I grasp principles and ideas that I am 
able to "understand particulars as anything more than a 
buzzing, booming confusion?" Why, in short, is knowledge 
grounded in our lived-grasping of essences? For Husserl, 
there can be only one response: because experience is 
Evidenz, and Evidenz (qua seeing) involves "focusing our 
eyes or field glasses until the shape or color emerges 
clearly and unambiguously" (Kohak, p. 144, my emphasis). 
In short, "Evidenz demands absolute clarity, not obscure 
familiarity." Here we come at last to the ultimate clash 
between a Wittgensteinian and a Husserlian: each says 
emphatically, "Go out into the world and look! See what 
is there; don't merely assume it is there. Find it!" But 
when Husserl looks about himself, he sees (grasps) the 
concept of courage. True, Kohak remarks, he might at 
first see merely a series of profiles in courage, each 
different "but all sharing that common trait," yet if he 
looks long enough he will—in one "clear, sharp, and 
evident grasp"—see that very "principle which all 
instances share" (Kohak, p. 145). But is not Husserl 
merely presupposing that such principles exist? 
Wittgenstein looks around and "sees" only "family 
resemblances." He asks us to think about what it is about 
all the games we know of which leads us to call them all 
by the same name: 
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What is common to that all?—Don't say: "There must 
be something common, or they would not be called 
•games'"—but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all.—For if you look at them you will not 
see anything that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To 
repeat: don't think, but look! (Philosophical 
Investigations, 1166) 
Wittgenstein is here questioning the fundamental 
Husserlian move as well as the epistemological illusion of 
apodicticity which seems to underlie it. Merleau-Ponty 
•also challenges this notion of grasping the eidos. (1 
refer the reader to the chapter in his Phenomenology of 
Perception entitled "The Cogito," especially pp. 387-88.) 
Wittgenstein would say that Husserl is being driven by a 
false picture, namely the search for certainty, unity, and 
the essential properties which are required for 
intelligibility to mirror exactness. Thus it is no 
surprise that Husserl feels we can look at a series of 
instances of courage and "see the principle at, 
metaphorically speaking, different distances, from 
different angles, until (we hit) on one from which (we) 
can focus clearly and sharply—say, an instance of courage 
which strikes a chord in (our) own experience" (Kohak, p. 
145). I do not mean to side with Wittgenstein on this 
issue. I merely bring up the contrast between the results 
of two attempts to "look and see" which Kohak fails to 
mention. For the Husserlian enterprise to find itself on 
solid ground with respect to its claim that we can 
experience eidetic insight, it must answer the 
wittgensteinian challenge. It is not enough to assume 
universals are experienced, and then go on to 
theoretically dissect our "faculty" of experiencing into 
hyletic-, noetic-, and noematic-phases merely to account 
(in transcendental fashion) for this "ability" we 
(supposedly) possess. I am suggesting, of course, that a 
transcendental argument cannot accompany Husserl*s claim 
to the rigorous, pre-suppositionless foundation of his 
enterprise. But perhaps this approach can be defended. 
It is clear that Kohak fails to see this as a problem 
worthy of notice, but this is because he feels his 
examples vindicate Husserl before the question can even be 
posed. For instance, he asks us to imagine a situation 
where suddenly we find ourselves exclaiming, "That's just 
what I needed!" He feels this exclamation shows that the 
speaker "knew 'in principle* what he needed long before he 
actually saw a 'fact' to fit that need," and, furthermore, 
he feels that this act of "looking for something to 'make 
do' presupposes a mature eidetic grasp" (Kohak, p. 22, my 
emphasis). So I decided to take up his challenge, 
imagining myself (as I have done a few times in my life) 
staring at a puzzle and suddenly finding that one clue 
which allows all the other pieces to "fall right into 
place," as the saying goes. The question to ask here is: 
Did I know (in any sense of the word) that this was the 
piece I needed to solve the puzzle? I sincerely doubt 
that I did. Rather, it would seem that I recognized a 
certain lack which was filled by something which took me 
by complete surprise, something which suddenly stood out 
as the essential figure in the ground of the puzzle-to-be-
solved. This hardly suggests a mature eidetic grasp! And 
yet it does seem to suggest an ante-predicative grasping 
of something. (And here I leave you with an I-know-not-
what.) 
H I 
In general, I found Idea and Experience a remarkably 
clear work, expecially within the context of Husserlian 
scholarship. Specifically, it highlights many of the 
serious flaws in the Boyce-Gibson translation of the 
Ideen, flaws which make it virtually impossible to 
decipher Husserl's intent. Secondly, the book indicates 
how Husserl's late works either illucidate, build upon, or 
run counter to the basic insights of the Ideen . Thirdly, 
Kohak's utilization of the theme of subject-orientation in 
his own suggestions for practical applications of 
Husserlian method makes it extremely clear how Husserl's 
transcendental ego differs from and compares to Kant's 
notion of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
Finally, I think Kohak argues strongly against the 
temptation to consider Husserl an Idealist. At the same 
time, he makes clear why Husserl cannot be classified as a 
realist, either. In short, these classifications do not 
apply to Husserl because he postulates neither that 
"matter" is real and "ideas" derivative, nor that "ideas" 
are real and "matter" is derivative. Instead, he takes 
experience in its "lived unity," prior to any judgmental 
or interpretive acts, and thus is able—it is argued--to 
stand "beyond" the "objective" and the "subjective" alike 
(Kohak, p. 172). It is the subject-as-such, not the 
occupant of a particular subjective posture, which is 
given Husserl's focus, and it is the world, not as an 
objectively "neutral" sphere encasing our activity, but as 
a context of primordial givenness "which we constitute as 
a meaningful whole by our (living intentional) presence" 
that shows forth as the "region" of our being. And of 
course neither this notion of subject-as-such nor the 
world as constituted by a subject's intentional 
orientation can be primary for Husserl, since experience 
in its givenness is primary. This much seems entirely 
defensable, especially given Kohak's gloss. It remains to 
be seen whether or not the foundation of Husserl's 
epistemological project can survive a rigorous 
examination. But it seems that we owe him the gratitude 
of coming to grips with his priceless notion of reality-
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as-experiential whether or not the project survives. 
Without such a notion in our philosophical repertoire, we 
are apt to remain philosophers-in-abstraction. 
